

ARGUMENTATION

The notion of argument and natural argumentation

Argumentation games

Legal argumentation

Arguing with priorities

WHAT IS AN ARGUMENT?

AN ARGUMENT IS

Ambiguous in natural language

- **Used as some sort of "reason"**
a piece of evidence related to the case at stake
(pure view as premises)
- **Move or sequence of moves in a dispute**
(composition in context)
- **Stating relations between propositions**
that are in some sense necessary (proof)
(including logical relations)

WHAT IS NATURAL ARGUMENTATION?

AN EXAMPLE OF NATURAL ARGUMENTATION

P: I offer you my car for \$20000.

O: Why should I pay \$20000? Bob's car is similar and is only \$17000.

P: \$20000 is a good price since my car is safer.

O: Why is your car safer?

P: Since it has an airbag.

O: That doesn't make your car safer: the newspapers recently reported on exploding airbags.

P: But a scientific study has shown that cars with airbags are safer. And scientific studies are more reliable than newspapers.

O: OK, I admit that your car is safer. Still I cannot pay \$20000; I offer \$18000.

P: OK, I accept your offer.

SOME PROPERTIES OF NATURAL ARGUMENTATION

Raising pieces of evidence to strengthen or weaken a position at stake

The content of arguments (premises) may be of various sources

Strength of arguments may vary

Arguments may stand in conflict

Arguments are defeasible

Arguments are raised dynamically

Arguments need to be compared and evaluated

In some contrast with "logical" argumentation, e.g., deductive syllogisms

DEFEASIBILITY AND PROBABILITY

The lottery paradox

A fair lottery with 1 million tickets and 1 price

Probability that some ticket wins is 1

Probability that a given ticket wins is 0.000001

Is the conclusion that a given ticket will not win justified?

As a consequence, one could conclude that no ticket would win

Probability theory produces mere probabilities

Many plausible reasoning patterns are statistically invalid (e.g., chaining)

Non-monotonic logics ignore statistical dependencies between variables

NATURAL VERSUS LOGICAL ARGUMENTATION

	<i>Logical Argumentation</i>	<i>Natural Argumentation</i>
<i>Truth of arguments</i>	required	debatable
<i>Completeness</i>	required	incomplete
<i>Strength</i>	equal	varying
<i>Reasoning pattern</i>	modus ponens	complex interrelations

CRITIQUE ON DEDUCTIVE MODELS

Logical argument and reasoning centered around logical syllogisms


Public discourse, argument, speaking and debate does not follow these

How can we model natural argumentation?

Toulmin, a philosopher in the 1960s has developed an argumentation schema

Intended to analyse public argumentation

TOULMIN'S SCHEMATA



CENTRAL ELEMENTS

Data

Starting point of the argumentation

Types: Evidence, fact, example, opinion, experience, statistics

Claim

Purpose behind argumentation

Position to issue

JUSTIFICATION

Warrant

Logical connection between data and claim

Types:

Authority

Motivation (depends on audience)

Substantive (most similar to logic)

SUPPORTIVE ELEMENTS

Backing

Helps reasoning, enhances credibility

Same types as data

Reservation


Exception, limitation

Same types as data

Qualifier

Relative strength

TOULMIN'S SCHEMATA - DATA STRUCTURE



KINDS OF REASONS

Distinction according to defeasibility

- *indefeasible* reasons (deductive reasons):
conclusive reasons, that is, they logically entail the conclusion
- *defeasible* reasons (prima facie reasons):
adding additional information may destroy the reason connection

Definition *prima facie* reason (Pollock)

P is a *prima facie* reason for S to believe Q if and only if P is a reason for S to believe Q and there is an R such that R is logically consistent with P but (P & R) is not a reason for S to believe Q

Examples: perception, memory, statistics, enumerative and statistical induction

DEFEATERS FOR PRIMA FACIE REASONS

Definition (Pollock)

R is a *defeater* for P as a prima facie reason for Q if and only if P is a reason for S to believe Q and R is logically consistent with P but (P & R) is not a reason for S to believe Q

Two kinds of defeaters

***Rebutting* defeaters – reasons for denying the conclusion**

***Undercutting* defeaters – attack the connection between the reason and the conclusion**

Definition *Rebutting* defeater (Pollock)

R is a *rebutting defeater* for P as a prima facie reason for Q if and only if R is a defeater and R is a reason for believing $\neg Q$

Definition *Undercutting* defeater (Pollock)

R is an *undercutting defeater* for P as a prima facie reason for Q if and only if R is a defeater and R is a reason for denying that P wouldn't be true unless Q were true (i.e., $P \rightarrow Q$)

USES OF MODELS OF NATURAL ARGUMENTATION

Persuasion (in philosophy)

Argumentation structuring (e.g., for meetings)

Illustrating deductive argumentation

Legal reasoning (dispute resolution)

Collaboration and negotiation (in multi-agent environments)

Argumentative dialog systems

ISSUES IN MODELING NATURAL ARGUMENTATION

Support for finding relevant arguments

Structuring and visualizing arguments

Reasoning models to compare and assess arguments

Reasoning with arguments of varying strength

Argumentative discourse analysis

Argumentative dialog strategies

ARGUMENT SYSTEMS

Definition

An argument system is a pair $\langle X, \leftarrow \rangle$ where

- X is a set of arguments and
- $\leftarrow$ is a relation between pairs of arguments in X

($a \leftarrow b$ means “ b attacks a ”, “ b is a counterargument of a ”)

Status of arguments and sets of arguments

An argument a is *acceptable* with respects to a set of arguments C , if every attacker of a is attacked by a member of C

A conflict-free set S of arguments is *admissible* if each argument in S is acceptable with respect to S

A set of arguments is a *preferred extension* if it is a $\supseteq$ -maximal admissible set

A conflict-free set of arguments is a *stable extension* if it attacks every argument outside it

SOME KNOWN RESULTS

(Dung, AI Journal)

Each admissible set is contained in a $\supseteq$ -maximal admissible set

Every stable extension is preferred

Not every preferred extension is stable

Stable extensions do not always exist; preferred extensions always exist


Stable and preferred extensions are generally not unique

EXAMPLES FOR DEFINITIONS (1)

Conflict-Free Set

Given an argumentation framework $F = (A, R)$.

A set $S \subseteq A$ is *conflict-free* in F , if, for each $a, b \in S$, $(a, b) \notin R$.



$$cf(F) = \{\{a, c\}, \{a, d\}, \{b, d\}, \{a\}, \{b\}, \{c\}, \{d\}, \emptyset\}$$


EXAMPLES FOR DEFINITIONS (2)

Admissible Set

Given an argumentation framework $F = (A, R)$.

A set $S \subseteq A$ is *admissible* in F , if, for each $a, b \in S$, $(a, b) \notin R$.

- S is conflict-free in F
- each $a \in S$ is defended by S in F , ($a \in A$ is defended by S in F , if for each $b \in A$ with $(b, a) \in R$, there exists a $c \in S$, such that $(c, b) \in R$)



$$cf(F) = \{\{a, c\}, \{a, d\}, \{b, d\}, \{a\}, \{b\}, \{c\}, \{d\}, \emptyset\}$$

EXAMPLES FOR DEFINITIONS (3)


Grounded extension

Given an argumentation framework $F = (A, R)$.

The *grounded extension* of an argumentation framework $F = (A, R)$ is given by

the least fixpoint of the operator $\Gamma_F : 2^A \rightarrow 2^A$,

defined as $\Gamma_F(S) = \{a \in A \mid a \text{ is defended by } S \text{ in } F\}$



$$\text{ground}(F) = \{\{a\}\}$$


EXAMPLES FOR DEFINITIONS (4)

Preferred extension

Given an argumentation framework $F = (A, R)$.

A set $S \subseteq A$ is *preferred* in F , if

- S is *admissible* in F
- each $T \subseteq A$ admissible in F , not $T \supset S$



$$\text{pref}(F) = \{\{a, c\}, \{a, d\}, \{a\}, \{e\}, \{d\}, \emptyset\}$$


EXAMPLES FOR DEFINITIONS (5)

Stable extension

Given an argumentation framework $F = (A, R)$.

A set $S \subseteq A$ is *stable* in F , if

- S is *conflict-free* in F
- for each $a \in A \setminus S$, there exists a $b \in S$, such that $(b, a) \in R$



$$\text{stable}(F) = \{\{\cancel{a}, e\}, \{a, d\}, \{\cancel{b}, d\}, \{\cancel{a}\}, \{\cancel{b}\}, \{\cancel{c}\}, \{\cancel{d}\}, \emptyset\}$$

VALUE-BASED ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK

Definition

A value-based argumentation framework (VAF) is a 5-tuple:

$$VAF = \langle AR, attacks, V, val, valpref \rangle$$

***AR* and *attacks* are as for a standard argumentation framework**

***V* is a non-empty set of values**

val* is a function which maps from elements of *AR* to elements of *V

***valpref* is a preference relation (transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric) on $V \times V$.**

We say that an argument *A* relates to value *v* if accepting *A* promotes or defends *v*:

the value in question is given by $val(A)$. For $A \in AF$, $val(A) \in V$.

An argument $A \in AF$ defeats an argument $B \in AF$

if and only if both $attacks(A, B)$ and not $valpref(val(B), val(A))$.

Note that an attack succeeds if both arguments relate to the same value, or

if no preference between the values has been defined.

If *V* contains a single value, the VAF becomes a standard AF.

If each argument maps to a different value,

we have a Preference Based Argument Framework (Amgoud and Cayroll 1998)

IMPORTANT NOTIONS FOR VALUE-BASED ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK

An argument $A \in AR$ is *acceptable* with respect to set of arguments S ,

(*acceptable*(A, S)) if:

$$(\forall x)((x \in AR \ \& \ \textit{defeats}(x, A)) \rightarrow (\exists y)((y \in S) \ \& \ \textit{defeats}(y, x))).$$

A set S of arguments is *conflict-free* if

$$(\forall x) (\forall y)((x \in S \ \& \ y \in S) \rightarrow (\neg \textit{attacks}(x, y) \vee \textit{valpref}(\textit{val}(y), \textit{val}(x)))).$$

A conflict-free set of arguments S is *admissible* if

$$(\forall x)(x \in S \rightarrow \textit{acceptable}(x, S)).$$

A set of arguments S in an argumentation framework AF is a *preferred extension*

if it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible set of AR .

A conflict-free set of arguments S is a *stable extension*

if and only if S attacks each argument in AR which does not belong to S .

Given an order on values,

a *polychromatic* cycle in a *VAF* has a unique, non-empty preferred extension.

ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORKS

Components

- 1. The underlying logic**
- 2. Arguments (a move or a sequence of moves in a dispute)**
- 3. Conflicts between arguments (rebutting or undercutting)**
- 4. Standards for comparing arguments**
(ordering, e.g. specificity; only general criteria, such as non-circularity, transitivity)
- 5. Assessment of arguments**

The first two constitute a general logical framework, the last three are specific for argumentative frameworks

Note, that conflict resolution is done outside the proper logic

LAYERS IN ARGUMENTATION

Components

1. The *logical* layer

How pieces of information can be combined

2. The *dialectical* layer

Given a set of arguments and evaluation criteria, it defines which arguments prevail

3. The *procedural* layer

Regulates how an actual dispute is conducted, how each party can act and react

4. The *strategic* or *heuristic* layer

Rational ways of conducting a dispute within the rules given by the third layer

An alternative view (Gordon, Brewka) has three layers (missing the strategic part):

1. The *logical* layer (comprising levels 1 and 2 from the above)

2. The *speechact* layer (differentiating level 3 from the above)

3. The *protocol* layer (differentiating level 3 from the above)

THE FOUR LAYERS IN A LEGAL DISPUTE

An example

P₁: I claim that John is guilty of murder.

O₁: I deny your claim.

P₂: John's fingerprints were on the knife.

If someone stabs a person to death, his fingerprints must be on the knife.

So, John has stabbed Bill to death.

If a person stabs someone to death, he is guilty of murder.

So, John is guilty of murder.

O₂: I concede your premises, but I disagree that they imply your claim:

Witness X says that John has pulled the knife out of the dead body.

This explains why his fingerprints were on the knife.

P₃: X's testimony is inadmissible evidence, since she is anonymous.

Therefore, my claim still stands.

THE FOUR LAYERS IN THE LEGAL DISPUTE

The procedural layer

With P_1 , the proponent of a claim starts a dispute by stating his claim.

The opponent can either accept or deny this claim

Since the opponent does not accept, the burden of proof passes to P.

P attempts to fulfil this burden with a argument for his claim (P_2).

The logical layer

Whether a non-deductive argument is constructible, is determined at this layer.

This hold for arguments with an abductive inference step, such as P_2 .

The dialectical layer

Whether an argument has attacking sufficient strength is determined at this layer.

The strategic layer

Evidence can be attacked by arguing that it is inadmissible, which it what P_3 does.

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES (Walton)

Components

A basic scheme - rationale reasoning pattern

Critical questions - making implicit premises explicit

A list of schemas developed

- 1. Argument from Analogy**
- 2. Argument from a Verbal Classification**
- 3. Argument from Rule**
- 4. Argument from Exception to a Rule**
- 5. Argument from Precedent**
- 6. Practical Reasoning**
- 7. Lack of Knowledge Arguments**
- 8. Arguments from Consequences**
- 9. Fear and Danger Appeals**
- 10. Arguments from Alternatives and Opposites**
- 11. Pleas for Help and Excuses**

LIST OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES CONT'D

- 12. Composition and Division Arguments**
- 13. Slippery Slope Arguments**
- 14. Arguments from General Acceptance**
- 15. Argument from Commitment**
- 16. Arguments from Inconsistency**
- 17. Ethotic Ad Hominem**
- 18. Circumstantial Ad Hominem**
- 19. Argument from Bias**
- 20. Ad Hominem Strategies to Rebut a Personal Attack**
- 21. Argument from Cause to Effect**
- 22. Argument from Effect to Cause**
- 23. Argument from Correlation to Cause**
- 24. Argument from Evidence to a Hypothesis**
- 25. Abductive Reasoning**
- 26. Argument from Position to Know**
- 27. Argument from Expert Opinion**
- 28. Argument from Waste**

More schemes (subtypes) later developed, various categorizations

AN EXAMPLE ARGUMENTATION SCHEME

Appeal to expert opinion - basic structure

Source Premise:

Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.

Assertion Premise:

E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false).

Warrant Premise:

**If source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A, and
E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false),
then A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).**

Conclusion:

A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).

CRITICAL QUESTIONS TO THIS SCHEME

Function

If a respondent asks any of the critical questions appropriate for some scheme, the proponent must either give a satisfactory answer to the question asked, or else give up the appeal to the argument encapsulated in the scheme

Critical questions for appeal to experts opinion

- 1. Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?**
- 2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?**
- 3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?**
- 4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?**
 - Subquestion 1: Is E biased?**
 - Subquestion 2: Is E honest?**
 - Subquestion 3: Is E conscientious?**
- 5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?**
- 6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E's assertion based on evidence?**

ABDUCTIVE ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES

F is a finding or given set of facts

E is a satisfactory explanation of F

No alternative explanation E given so far is as satisfactory as E

E is plausible, as a hypothesis with the following critical questions:

- (1) How satisfactory is E itself as an explanation of F,
apart from the alternative explanations available so far in the dialogue?**
- (2) How much better an explanation is E than
the alternative explanations available so far in the dialogue?**
- (3) How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry,
how thorough has the search been in the investigation of the case?**
- (4) Would it be better to continue the dialogue further,
instead of drawing a conclusion at this point?**

ARGUMENTATION SCHEME FOR ARGUMENT FROM CORRELATION TO CAUSE

PREMISE There is a positive correlation between A and B.

CONCLUSION Therefore A causes B.

Three critical questions matching the scheme

CQ1: Is there really a correlation between A and B?

CQ2: Is there any reason to think that the correlation is any more
than a coincidence?

CQ3: Could there be some third factor C, that is causing both A and B?

FROM NATURAL LANGUAGE TO LOGIC

(Wynner)

A case under debate - How can a government reduce the amount of garbage?

Example text (1)

- 1. Every householder should pay tax for the garbage which the householder throws away.**
- 2. No householder should pay tax for the garbage which the householder throws away.**
- 3. Paying tax for garbage increases recycling.**
- 4. Recycling more is good.**
- 5. Paying tax for garbage is unfair.**
- 6. Every householder should be charged equally.**
- 7. Every householder who takes benefits does not recycle.**

FROM NATURAL LANGUAGE TO LOGIC

A case under debate - How can a government reduce the amount of garbage?

Example text (2)

- 8. Every householder who does not take benefits pays for every householder who does take benefits.**
- 9. Professor Resicke says that recycling reduces the need for new garbage dumps.**
- 10. A reduction of the need for new garbage dumps is good.**
- 11. Professor Resicke is not objective.**
- 12. Professor Resicke owns a recycling company.**
- 13. A person who owns a recycling company earns money from recycling.**
- 14. Supermarkets create garbage.**
- 15. Supermarkets should pay tax.**
- 16. Supermarkets pass the taxes for the garbage to the consumer.**

THE ROLE OF NATURAL LANGUAGE STATEMENTS

Statements by individuals, linguistically "polished", in may be introduced in different order

An individual makes statement [1]

Another makes [4] as a reason or premise for [1]

Yet another makes [3] as an additional reason for [3],

which can be understood to lend greater strength to the claim that [1] should hold.

[9] supports the claim in [4].

However, this is undercut by the claim that the Professor is not objective,

so the implication one might draw from his statement does not hold.

In [2], we have a counter-proposal with a range of supporting reasons;

understood as a rebuttal to the previous argument in favour of taxing garbage.


[16] attacks [15], which is one of the premises of the argument in favour of [2],

so constitutes a premise defeat.

In some cases, there is an intuition that one statement attacks another statement

Much is left implicit

GRAPHICAL DISPLAY OF ARGUMENTS



Each statement is represented as a node

Claims and premises are represented with continuous arrows between nodes

Contradictions or conflicts between statements are represented with dashed arrows

(from 11, 16, and between 1 and 2)

RECASTING IN AN ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK


Abstracting the “arguments” and their relationship into an argumentation framework

Argument a1 is comprised of statements {1, 3, 4, 9, 10},

a2 of {11, 12, 13},

a3 of {2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15}, and

a4 of {16}



There are several preferred extensions depending on what is asserted to be true:

if neither of a2 or a4 hold, then {a1} and {a3};

if a2 holds, but a4 not hold, then {a2, a3};

if a4 holds, but a2 does not, then {a4, a1}

STATE OF AFFAIRS

Major issue is the translation into an argumentation framework

Abstracting from subtleties of relations between details of arguments

Abstracting from linguistic subtleties of argument presentations

Interpretation of ambiguous, implicit relations between statements/arguments

In particular:

- 1. What are the well-formedness conditions on premises and conclusions?**
- 2. How is inconsistency between one statement and another determined?**
- 3. What is the relevant notion of “attack” between arguments?**
- 4. How is implicit information represented (enthymemes)?**
- 5. Must an “argument” comprised of premises and a conclusion be introduced as a whole or can “arguments” be constructed incrementally?**