======================================================================= Abstract for I3 Spring Days Workshop on BEHAVIOR PLANNING FOR LIFE-LIKE CHARACTERS AND AVATARS Architectural Requirements for Human-like Agents (What sorts of machines can love?) Aaron Sloman School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham Birmingham B15 2TT UK EMAIL A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/ Abstract: If instead of thinking only about normal adult humans we consider also infants, people with brain damage or disease, and also other animals including insects, bacteria, birds, bonobos, etc., we find evidence for myriad information processing architectures each supporting and explaining a specific combination of mental capabilities. Yet more possible architectures, each supporting a collection of possible states and processes can be found in robots, software systems and machines of the future! Thus concepts describing mental states and processes in one animal or machine may be inappropriate when describing another. Likewise, concepts relevant to normal adult humans may be inappropriate for new-born infants or victims of alzheimer's disease. It is arguable that much of what poets and novelists say about us, and what we say about our friends and ourselves when gossipping or discussing our interests, loves, hopes, fears and ambitions, implicitly presupposes that humans are essentially information processing systems. E.g. when poets distinguish fickle liking which is easily diminished by new information and deep love which is not, they implicitly presuppose that new information can have effects on powerful information-based control states. By considering possible descriptive and explanatory concepts generated by a *virtual machine based information processing architecture* we obtain a broader and deeper explanatory theory than is normally found in philosophy, psychology or social science. A proper understanding requires comparative analysis in design space. We understand a particular architecture better if we know what differences would arise out of various sorts of design changes: which capabilities would be lost and which would be added. This involves going beyond the majority of AI projects or psychological investigations in considering both designs for *complete* agents and also doing *comparative* analysis of different sorts of designs. Discovering the architecture of a complex system we have not designed ourselves is very difficult. No amount of observation of the behaviour of any animal or machine can determine the underlying architecture, since in principle any lifelong set of behaviours can be produced by infinitely many different information processing architectures. Decompiling information gleaned from either invasive or non-invasive observation of internal physical structures is just as hard, e.g. if we don't even know at what physical level most of the architecture is implemented. Do neurones or molecules do most of the information processing? We can best constrain our theories by combining a number of considerations, such as: (1) trade-offs that can influence evolutionary developments, (2) what is known about our evolutionary history, (3) what is known about human and animal brains and the effects of brain damage, (4) what we have learnt in AI about the scope and limitations of various information processing architectures, mechanisms and representations, (5) introspective evidence, such as my knowledge that I considered and evaluated alternative ways of travelling to this conference. But our theories are will be condemned to being *conjectures* for years to come. At least we can show that some conjectures are better than others, if we take a broad enough view of what needs to be explained. I'll offer a conjectural theory ((a)-(f) below) based on those constraints: (a) Evolution, like engineers, found that (partly) modular designs are essential for defeating combinatorics in the search for solutions to complex problems (with only 4,000,000,000 years and one biosphere). (b) Human information processing makes use of (at least) three different concurrently active architectural layers which evolved at different times, which we share with other animals to varying degrees, and which, along with various additional supporting modules, account for different cognitive and affective states, as well as different possible effects of brain damage, and other abnormalities. (c) Reactive, deliberative and reflective layers support different classes of emotions found in humans: (i) the reactive layer accounts for primary emotions (e.g. being startled, frozen with terror, sexually aroused); (ii) the deliberative layer supports emotions like apprehension and relief which require "what if" reasoning abilities; (iii) a meta-management (reflective) layer supports not only control of thought and attention but also loss of such control, as found in typically human tertiary emotions such as infatuation, humiliation, thrilled anticipation of a future event. (It is also crucial to absorption of a culture and various kinds of mathematical, philosophical and scientific thinking.) All the layers are subject to interference from the others and from one or more fast but stupid partly trainable "global alarm" mechanisms. (d) Perceptual and motor systems are also layered: the different layers evolved at different times, act concurrently, and have different relationships to the "central" layers. (e) Analysing ways in which components of such an architecture might bootstrap themselves, develop, reorganise themselves, acquire and store information, will provide far richer theories of learning and development than ever before. (f) A multi-layered architecture of the sort proposed could give robots human-like mental states and processes, including qualia, leading some of them to re-discover philosophical confusions about consciousness. Software agents could have similar capabilities. Many doubt this because they see the limitations of existing computer-based machines and software systems and cannot imagine any ways of overcoming these limitations. They do not realise that we are still in the early stages of learning how to design information processing systems. (Claiming that computers will be ever more powerful is not enough to allay these doubts: we also need deep analysis of the concepts used to express the doubts.) Existing AI systems do not yet have whatever it takes to enjoy or dislike doing something. They do not really *want* to do something or *care* about whether it succeeds or fails, even though they may be programmed to give the superficial appearance of wanting and caring. Simulated desires and emotions represented by values for global variables (e.g. degree of "fear") or simple entries in databases linked to condition-action rules fail to address the way emotions emerge from interactions within an architecture, and fail to distinguish emotions requiring different sorts of architectures. Current attempts to replicate other animal abilities are also limited: for example, visual and motor capabilities of current artificial systems are nowhere near those of a squirrel, monkey or nest-building bird. To understand animal comprehension of space and motion we may need to understand the differences between precocial species born or hatched with considerable independence (chickens, deer) and altricial species which start utterly helpless (eagles, cats, apes). Perhaps the bootstrapping of visuo-motor control architectures in the latter yields a far deeper grasp of space and motion than evolution could have pre-programmed via DNA. Artificial agents which do not share our deep grasp of spatial structure and motion will be limited in their ability to communicate with us. Depending on time available and the interests of people at the workshop, these and other related themes will be presented and their implications explored. Acknowledgement: many colleagues and students have helped with the development of these ideas, most recently Brian Logan. NOTE: This work is presented at length in papers in the Birmingham University Cognition and Affect FTP archive. Recent papers are listed in ftp://ftp.cs.bham.ac.uk/pub/groups/cog_affect/0-INDEX.html The project is summarised in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/cogaff.html Our software tools including the SIM_AGENT toolkit (Pop-11 based code and documentation) can be found via this directory: ftp://ftp.cs.bham.ac.uk/pub/dist/poplog/