Publikation

On Safe Kernel Stable Coalition Forming among Agents

Bastian Blankenburg, Matthias Klusch

In: Matthias Klusch (Hrsg.). Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-04) July 19-23 New York City NY United States Seiten 580-587 ISBN 1-58113-864-4 IEEE Computer Society 2004.

Abstrakt

We investigate and discuss safety and privacy preserving properties of a game-theortic based coalition algorithm KCA for forming kernel stable coalitions among information agents in face of imperfect information on actual coalition values, and changing agent society. In addition, we analyze the chances of deceiving information agents to succeed in coalition negotiations using the KCA protocol. We show that a certain type of fraud which leads to an increase of individual profit can neither be prevented nor detected, but this comes at the expense of exponentially high computation costs for the deceiving agent.

Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz
German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence